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Abstract
The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e., up-to-ε) Bayesian
revenue maximization when selling two goods to an additive risk-neutral quasilinear
buyer was introduced by Hart and Nisan (2013), who give an upper bound of O(1/ε4) for
this problem. Using the optimal-transport duality framework of Daskalakis et al. (2013,
2015), we derive the first lower bound for this problem — of Ω(1/ 4
√
ε), even when the val-
ues for the two goods are drawn i.i.d. from “nice” distributions, establishing how to rea-
son about approximately optimal mechanisms via this duality framework. This bound
implies, for any fixed number of goods, a tight bound of Θ(log 1/ε) on the minimum de-
terministic communication complexity guaranteed to suffice for running some approxi-
mately revenue-maximizing mechanism, thereby completely resolving this problem. As
a secondary result, we show that under standard economic assumptions on distributions,
the above upper bound of Hart and Nisan (2013) can be strengthened to O(1/ε2).
1 Introduction
One of the high-level goals of the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to understand
the tradeoff between the economic efficiency and the simplicity of mechanisms, with a central
example being auction mechanisms. One of the most fundamental scenarios studied in this
context is that of revenue-maximization by a single seller who is offering for sale two or
more goods to a single buyer. Indeed, while classic economic analysis (Myerson, 1981) shows
that for a single good, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is extremely simple to describe,
it is known that the optimal auction for even two goods may be surprisingly complex and
unintuitive (McAfee and McMillan, 1988; Thanassoulis, 2004; Manelli and Vincent, 2006;
Hart and Reny, 2015; Daskalakis et al., 2013, 2015; Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias, 2014,
2015), eluding a general description to date.
In this paper we study, for a fixed number of goods, the tradeoff between the complexity
of an auction and the extent to which it can approximate the optimal revenue. While one
may choose various measures of auction complexity (Hart and Nisan, 2013; Dughmi et al.,
2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015), we join several recent papers by focusing on the
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simplest measure, the menu-size suggested by Hart and Nisan (2013). While previous lower
bounds on the menu-size as a function of the desired approximation to the revenue all assume
a coupling between the number of goods and the desired approximation (so that the former
tends to infinity simultaneously with the latter tending to optimal; e.g., setting ε , 1/n),
in this paper we focus on the behavior of the menu-size as a function only of the desired
approximation to the revenue, keeping the number of goods fixed and uncoupled from it. In
particular, we obtain the first lower-bound on the menu-size that is not asymptotic in the
number of goods, thereby quantifying the degree to which the menu-size of an auction really
is a bottleneck to extracting high revenue even for a fixed number of goods.
Revenue Maximization We consider the following classic setting. A risk-neutral seller
has two goods for sale. A risk-neutral quasilinear buyer has a valuation (maximum willingness
to pay) vi ∈ [0, 1] for each of these goods i,1 and has an additive valuation (i.e., values the bun-
dle of both goods by the sum of the valuations for each good). The seller has no access to the
valuations vi, but only to a joint distribution F from which they are drawn. The seller wishes
to devise a (truthful) auction mechanism for selling these goods, which will maximize her rev-
enue among all such mechanisms, in expectation over the distribution F . (The seller has no
use for any unsold good.) We denote the maximum obtainable expected revenue by OPT(F ).
Menu-Size Hart and Nisan (2013) have introduced the menu-size of a mechanism as a
measure of its complexity: this measure counts the number of possible outcomes of the
mechanism (where an outcome is a specification of an allocation probability for each good,
coupled with a price).2 Daskalakis et al. (2013) have shown that even in the case of indepen-
dently distributed valuations for the two goods, precise revenue maximization may require
an infinite menu-size; Daskalakis et al. (2015) have shown this even when the valuations for
the two goods are drawn i.i.d. from “nice” distributions. In light of these results, relaxations
of this problem, allowing for mechanisms that maximize revenue up-to-ε, were considered.
Approximate Revenue Maximization Hart and Nisan (2013) have shown that a menu-
size of O(1/ε4) suffices for maximizing revenue up to an additive ε:
Theorem 1 (Hart and Nisan, 2013). There exists C(ε) = O(1/ε4) such that for every ε > 0
and for every distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]2), there exists a mechanism M with menu-size at most
C(ε) such that RevF (M) > OPT(F )− ε. (RevF (M) is the expected revenue of M from F .)
While the above-described results of Daskalakis et al. imply that the menu-size required
for up-to-ε revenue maximization tends to infinity as ε tends to 0, no lower bound whatsoever
was known on the speed at which it tends to infinity. (I.e., all that was known was that the
menu-size is ω(1) as a function of ε.) Our main result, which we prove in Section 2, is the
first lower bound on the required menu-size for this problem,3 showing that a polynomial
dependence on ε is not only sufficient, but also required, hence establishing that the menu-
size really is a nontrivial bottleneck to extracting high revenue, even for two goods and even
when the valuations for the goods are drawn i.i.d. from “nice” distributions:
1Having 1 rather than any other upper bound is without loss of generality, as the units are arbitrary.
2By the Taxation Principle, any mechanism is essentially described by the menu of its possible outcomes,
as the mechanism amounts to the buyer choosing from this menu an outcome that maximizes her utility.
3In fact, we do not know of any previous menu-size bound, for any problem, that lower-bounds the menu-
size as a function of ε without having the number of goods n also tend to infinity (e.g., by setting ε , 1/n).
2
Theorem 2 (Menu-Size: Lower Bound). There exist C(ε) = Ω(1/ 4√ε) and a distribution
F ∈ ∆([0, 1]), such that for every ε > 0 it is the case that RevF 2(M) < OPT(F 2) − ε for
every mechanism M with menu-size at most C(ε).
Our proof of Theorem 2 uses the optimal-transport duality framework of Daskalakis et al.
(2013, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of this framework to reason
about approximately optimal mechanisms, thereby establishing how to leverage this frame-
work to do so.
Communication Complexity As Babaioff et al. (2017) show, the logarithm (base 2,
rounded up) of the menu-size of a mechanism is precisely the deterministic communication
complexity (between the seller and the buyer) of running this mechanism, when the de-
scription of the mechanism itself is common knowledge. Therefore, by Theorems 1 and 2,
we obtain a tight bound on the minimum deterministic communication complexity guaran-
teed to suffice for running some up-to-ε revenue-maximizing mechanism, thereby completely
resolving this problem:
Corollary 3 (Communuication Complexity: Tight Bound). There exists D(ε) = Θ(log 1/ε)
such that for every ε > 0 it is the case that D(ε) is the minimum communication complexity
that satisfies the following: for every distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]2) there exists a mechanism M
such that the deterministic communication complexity of running M is D(ε) and such that
RevF (M) > OPT(F )− ε. This continues to hold even if F is guaranteed to be a product of
two independent identical distributions.
In Section 4, we extend this tight communication-complexity bound to any fixed number
of goods, as well as derive analogues of our results for multiplicative up-to-ε approximation.
While our lower bound completely resolves the open question of whether a polynomial
menu-size is necessary (and not merely sufficient), and while it tightly characterizes the
related communication complexity, it does not yet fully characterize the precise polynomial
dependence of the menu-size on ε. While the proof of our lower bound (Theorem 2) makes
delicate use of a considerable amount of information regarding the optimal mechanism via the
optimal-transport duality framework of Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015), the proof of the upper
bound of Hart and Nisan (2013) (Theorem 1) makes use of very little information regarding
the optimal mechanism. (As noted above, indeed very little is known regarding the structure
of general optimal mechanisms.) Our secondary result, which we prove in Section 3, shows
that under standard economic assumptions on valuation distributions, the upper bound of
Hart and Nisan (2013) can be tightened by two orders of magnitude. This suggests that it may
well be possible to use more information regarding the structure of optimal mechanisms, as
such will be discovered, to unconditionally improve the upper bound of Hart and Nisan (2013).
Theorem 4 (Menu-Size: Conditional Upper Bound). There exists C(ε) = O(1/ε2) such that
for every ε > 0 and for every distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]2) satisfying the McAfee-McMillan
hazard condition (see Definition 1 in Section 3), there exists a mechanism M with menu-size
at most C(ε) such that RevF (M) > OPT(F )− ε.
The question of a precise tight bound on the menu-size required for up-to-ε revenue
maximization remains open, for correlated as well as product (even i.i.d.) distributions. We
further discuss our results and their connection to other results and open problems in the
literature in Section 5.
3
2 Lower Bound
We prove our lower bound (i.e., Theorem 2) by considering the setting in which Daskalakis
et al. (2015) show that precise revenue maximization requires infinite menu-size, that is, the
case of two items with i.i.d. valuations each drawn from the Beta distribution F , B(1, 2),
i.e., the distribution over [0, 1] with density f(x) , 2(1− x). We first present, in Section 2.1,
a very high-level overview of the main proof idea in a way that does not go into any technical
details regarding the duality framework of Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015). We then present,
in Section 2.2, only the minimal amount of detail from the extensive analysis of Daskalakis
et al. (2015) that is required to follow our proof. Finally, in Section 2.3 we prove Theorem 2.
2.1 Proof Idea Overview
We start by presenting a very high-level overview of the main idea of the proof of Theorem 2
in a way that does not go into any technical details regarding the duality framework of
Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015).
Fix a concrete distribution from which the values of the goods are drawn. Let us denote
the set of all truthful mechanisms by Sp and for each sp ∈ Sp, let us denote its expected
revenue by op(sp).
4 The revenue maximization problem is to find a solution sp ∈ Sp for which
the value of the objective function op is maximal. Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015) identify a
dual problem to the revenue maximization problem: this is a minimization problem, i.e., a
problem where the goal is to find a solution sd from a specific set of feasible solutions Sd that
they identify, that minimizes the value od(sd) of a specific objective function od that they
identify. This problem is an instance of a class of problems called optimal-transport problems,
and it is a dual problem to the revenue maximization problem in the sense that for every
pair of solutions (sp, sd) for the primal (revenue maximization) problem and dual (optimal-
transport) problem respectively, it holds that the value of the primal objective function for
the primal solution is upper-bounded by the value of the dual objective function for the dual
solution, that is,
∀sp ∈ Sp, sd ∈ Sd : op(sp) ≤ od(sd). (1)
(See Equation (5) below for the full details.) This property is called weak duality. Daskalakis
et al. (2015) also show that this duality is strong in the sense that there always exists a pair
of solutions (sˆp, sˆd) for the primal and dual problems respectively such that
op(sˆp) = od(sˆd). (2)
A standard observation in duality frameworks is that such sˆd certifies that sˆp is an optimal
solution for the primal problem, since by Equation (1) the value of any primal solution
is bounded by od(sˆd) = op(sˆp). Indeed, Daskalakis et al. (2015) use their framework to
identify and certify optimal primal solutions (revenue-maximizing mechanisms) by identifying
such pairs (sˆp, sˆd). To facilitate finding such pairs of solutions, they identify complementary
slackness conditions, that is, conditions on sp and sd that are necessary and sufficient for
the inequality in Equation (1) to in fact be an equality as in Equation (2). In particular,
for the revenue maximization problem where the two items are sampled i.i.d. from the Beta
4As will become clear momentarily, S and s stand for “solution,” p stands for “primal,” and o stands for
“objective.”
4
distribution F = B(1, 2), they identify such a pair of solutions (sˆp, sˆd). They in fact show the
that complementary slackness conditions (for this distribution) uniquely define the optimal
primal solution and that this solution has an infinite menu-size.
The main idea of our proof is, with the optimal dual sˆd that Daskalakis et al. (2015)
identify in hand, to carefully show that for every primal solution sp that is a mechanism with
small menu-size, these complementary slackness conditions not only fail to hold for (sp, sˆd)
(as follows from the result of Daskalakis et al., 2015), but in fact are sufficiently violated to
yield the required separation, that is,
op(sp) < od(sˆd)− ε = op(sˆp)− ε, (3)
where sˆp is the optimal primal solution and the equality is by Equation (2). (See Equation (7)
below for the full details.)
In slightly more detail, Daskalakis et al. (2015) show that for two items sampled i.i.d. from
F = B(1, 2), the complementary slackness conditions dictate that in a certain part of the
value space, the set of values of buyers to which Good 2 (say) is allocated with probability 1
by the optimal mechanism and the set of values of buyers to which it is allocated with
probability 0 in that mechanism are separated by a strictly concave curve (the curve S in
Figure 1 below) and that this implies that the optimal mechanism has an infinite menu-size.
Another way to state this conclusion is to observe that it follows from known properties that
in a mechanism with a finite menu-size such a curve must be piecewise-linear rather than
strictly concave, and so to conclude that the optimal mechanism cannot have a finite menu-
size. Roughly speaking, we relate the loss in revenue (compared to the optimal mechanism)
of a given mechanism to a certain metric (see below) of the region between the separating
curve S of the optimal mechanism and an analogue of this curve (see below for the precise
definition) in the given mechanism. We then observe that this analogue of S is a piecewise-
linear curve with number of pieces at most the menu-size of the given mechanism, and use
this to appropriately lower-bound this metric (see Proposition 5 below) for mechanisms with
small menu-size. A lower bound on the loss in revenue for mechanisms with such a menu-size
follows.
To present our analysis in further detail, we must now first dive into some of the details
of the optimal-transport duality framework of Daskalakis et al. (2015).
2.2 Minimal Needed Essentials of the Optimal-Transport Duality
Framework of Daskalakis et al. (2015), and Commentary
We now present only the minimal amount of detail from the extensive analysis of Daskalakis
et al. (2015) that is required to follow our proof; the interested reader is referred to their paper
or to the excellent survey of Daskalakis (2015), whose notation we follow, for the full details
that lie beyond the scope of this paper. (See also Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias (2014)
for a slightly different duality approach, and Kash and Frongillo (2016) for an extension.)
In their analysis, Daskalakis et al. (2015) identify a signed Radon measure5 µ on [0, 1]2
5To understand our proof there is no need to be familiar with the general definition of a signed Radon
measure. It suffices to know that signed Radon measures generalize distributions that are defined by a
combination of atoms and a density function, and allow in particular for a) densities (and atoms) that can
also be negative (hence the term signed), and b) the overall measure not necessarily summing up to 1.
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with µ
(
[0, 1]2
)
= 0,6 such that for a mechanism with utility function7 u, the expected revenue
of this mechanism from F 2 is equal to8 ∫
[0,1]2
udµ. (4)
They show that (the utility function of) the revenue-maximizing mechanism is obtained by
maximizing Equation (4) subject to u(0, 0) = 0, to u being convex, and to ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]2 :
u(x)−u(y) ≤ ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1, where ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1 = ∑i max(0, xi− yi). (Rochet (1987) has shown
that the utility function of any truthful mechanism satisfies the latter two properties as well
as u(0, 0) ≥ 0. An equality as in the first property may be assumed without losing revenue
or changing the menu-size.)
We comment that while one could have directly attempted prove Theorem 2 by analyzing
how much revenue is lost in Equation (4) due to restricting attention only to u that corre-
sponds to a mechanism with a certain (small) menu-size (in particular, the graph of such u
is a maximum of C planes, where C is the menu-size), such an analysis, even if successful,
would have been hard and involved, and immensely tailored to the specifics of the distri-
bution F 2, due to the complex definition of µ. For this reason we base our analysis on the
duality-based framework of Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015), which they have developed to help
find and certify the optimal u, and we show, for the first time to the best of our knowledge,
how to use this framework to quantitatively reason about the revenue loss from suboptimal
mechanisms. The resulting approach is principled, general, and robust.9
Daskalakis et al. (2015) show that for every utility function u of a (truthful) mechanism
for valuations in [0, 1]2 and for every coupling10 γ of µ′+ and µ
′
−, where µ
′ = µ′+ − µ′− is any
measure that convex-dominates11 µ, it is the case that12∫
[0,1]2
udµ ≤
∫
[0,1]2×[0,1]2
∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1dγ(x, y). (5)
6That is, the overall measure sums up to 0.
7The utility function of a mechanism maps each buyer type (i.e., pair of valuations) to the utility that a
buyer of this type obtains from participating in the mechanism.
8This Lebesgue integral is the measure-theoretic analogue of the expectation (or average) of u with respect
to a given distribution (but as µ is not a distribution, when “averaging,” some values are taken with negative
weights, and weights do not sum up to 1).
9For example, readers familiar with the definition of exclusion set mechanisms (Daskalakis et al., 2015)
may notice that our analysis of F 2 below can be readily applied with virtually no changes also to other
distributions for which the optimal mechanism is derived from an exclusion set that is nonpolygonal (as Z is
in the analysis below).
10Informally (and sufficient to understand our proof), a coupling γ of two unsigned Radon measures µ1
and µ2 both having the same overall measure is a recipe for rearranging the mass of µ1 into the mass of µ2 by
specifying where each piece of (positive) mass is transported. Formally, a coupling γ of two unsigned Radon
measures µ1 and µ2 on [0, 1]
2 with µ1
(
[0, 1]2
)
= µ2
(
[0, 1]2
)
is an unsigned Radon measure on [0, 1]2 × [0, 1]2
whose marginals are µ1 and µ2, i.e., for every measurable set A ⊆ [0, 1]2, it holds that γ
(
A× [0, 1]2) = µ1(A)
and γ
(
[0, 1]2 ×A) = µ2(A).
11A distribution µ′ convex-dominates a distribution µ if µ′ is obtained from µ by shifting mass to coordinate-
wise larger points and by performing mean-preserving spreads of positive mass. To follow our paper only
a single property of convex dominance is needed — see below. As Daskalakis et al. (2015) show (but not
required for our proof), of interest in this context are in fact only cases where µ′ is obtained from µ by
mean-preserving spreads of positive mass.
12Once again, the Lebesgue integral on the right-hand side is the measure-theoretic analogue of the average
of the values
∣∣(x − y)+∣∣1, where, informally, each pair (x, y) is taken with weight equal to the amount of
(positive) mass transported by γ from x to y.
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(This is precisely Equation (1) in full detail.) They identify the optimal mechanism Mˆ for
the distribution F 2 by finding a measure13 µˆ′ and a coupling γˆ of µˆ′+ and µˆ
′
−, such that
Equation (5) holds with an equality for u = uˆ (the utility function of Mˆ) and γ = γˆ (this
is precisely Equation (2) in full detail).14 To find uˆ and γˆ, they make use of complementary
slackness conditions that they identify, and make sure they are all completely satisfied. In
our proof below, we will claim that for any utility function u that corresponds to a mech-
anism with small menu-size, the complementary slackness conditions with respect to u and
γˆ will be sufficiently violated so as to give sufficient separation between the left-hand side
of Equation (5) for u (that is, the revenue of the mechanism with small menu-size) and the
right-hand side of Equation (5) for γˆ (that is, the optimal revenue).
To better understand the complementary slackness conditions identified by Daskalakis
et al. (2015), let us review their proof for Equation (5):∫
[0,1]2
udµ ≤
∫
[0,1]2
udµ′ =
∫
[0,1]2
ud(µ′+ − µ′−) =
∫
[0,1]2×[0,1]2
(
u(x)− u(y))dγ(x, y) ≤
≤
∫
[0,1]2×[0,1]2
∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1dγ(x, y), (6)
where the first inequality is since u is convex (this inequality is the only property of convex
dominance that is needed to follow our paper), the second equality is by the definition of a
coupling, and the second inequality is due to the third property of u as defined above follow-
ing Equation (4). Daskalakis et al. (2015) note that if it would not be the case that γ-almost
everywhere15 we would have u(x)− u(y) = ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1, then the second inequality in Equa-
tion (6) would be strict, and so the same proof would give a strict inequality in Equation (5);
they use this insight to guide their search for the optimal uˆ and its tight dual γˆ. (They also
perform a similar analysis with respect to the first inequality in Equation (6), which we skip
as we do not require it.) In our proof below we will show that for the coupling γˆ that they
identify, and for any u that corresponds to a mechanism with small menu-size, this constraint
(i.e., that γ-almost everywhere u(x)− u(y) = ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1) will be significantly violated, in a
precise sense. To do so, we first describe the measure µˆ′ and the coupling γˆ that they identify.
Examine Figure 1. For our proof below it suffices to describe the measure µˆ′ and the
coupling γˆ, both restricted to a region R , [0, x′] × [0, 1] for an appropriate x′ > 0.16
The measure µˆ′ has a point mass of measure 1 in (0, 0), and otherwise in every (x1, x2) ∈
R \ {(0, 0)} has density
f(x1)f(x2)
(
1
1− x1 +
1
1− x2 − 5
)
.
In the region A, the coupling γˆ sends positive mass downward, from positive-density points
to negative-density points. In the region Z, the coupling γˆ sends positive mass from (0, 0)
13For this specific distribution F 2, the measure µˆ′ that they identify in fact equals µ.
14In fact, Daskalakis et al. (2015) prove a beautiful theorem that states that this (i.e., finding suitable
µ′ and γ such that Equation (5) holds with an equality for the optimal u) can be done for any underlying
distribution, i.e., that this duality is strong.
15Informally (and sufficient to understand our proof), for a condition to hold γ-almost everywhere means
for that condition to hold for every x and y such that the coupling γ transports (positive) mass from x to y.
16We choose x′ as the horizontal-axis coordinate of the right boundary of the region denoted by A in
Daskalakis et al. (2015).
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Figure 1: The optimal coupling γˆ identified by Daskalakis et al. (2015) for F 2, illustrated in
the region R = [0, x′]× [0, 1]. Figure adapted from Daskalakis et al. (2015) with permission.
upward and rightward to all points (the density is indeed negative throughout Z \ {(0, 0)}).
No other positive mass is transported inside R or into R. (Some additional positive mass
from (0, 0) is transported out of R.)
The optimal mechanism that Daskalakis et al. (2015) identify does not award any good
(nor does it charge any price) in the region Z, while awarding Good 2 with probability 1 and
Good 1 with varying probabilities (and charging varying prices) in the region A.
As Daskalakis et al. (2015) note, indeed γˆ-almost everywhere the complementary slack-
ness condition uˆ(x)− uˆ(y) = ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1 holds for this mechanism: in the region A, coupled
points x, y have x1 = y1 and x2 > y2, and in this region, uˆ
′
2 = 1; in the region Z, coupled
points have xi = 0 ≤ yi and uˆ(x) = uˆ(y). In fact, this reasoning shows that given the optimal
coupling γˆ, the utility function uˆ is uniquely defined by the complementary slackness condi-
tions, and so is the unique revenue-maximizing utility function. Since it is well known that
wherever a utility function u(x1, x2) of a truthful mechanism is differentiable, its derivative in
the direction of xi is the allocation probability of Good i (indeed, by examining Good i = 2
one can verify using this property that the mechanism corresponding to uˆ indeed awards
Good 2 with probability 1 in the region A and with probability 0 in the region Z), then by
examining Good i = 1, since the curve S (see Figure 1) that separates the regions Z and A
is strictly concave, Daskalakis et al. (2015) conclude that there is a continuum of allocation
probabilities of Good 1 in the mechanism corresponding to uˆ (which is the unique revenue-
maximizing mechanism), thus concluding that the unique revenue-maximizing mechanism for
the distribution F 2 has an infinite menu-size.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
An alternative way to state the conclusion of the argument of Daskalakis et al. (2015) that
any revenue-maximizing mechanism for F 2 has an infinite menus-size is as follows: let u be
8
the utility function of a mechanism M with a finite menu-size. It is well known that the graph
of u is the maximum of a finite number of planes (each corresponding to one entry in the
menu of M). Therefore, since S is strictly concave, it is impossible for u to have derivative 0
beneath the curve S and derivative 1 above the curve S, and so the complementary slackness
conditions must be violated, and hence M is not optimal. In our proof we will quantify
the degree of violation of the complementary slackness conditions as a function of the finite
menu-size of such u. We would like to reason as follows: for such u with a finite menu-size,
define the corresponding curve T that is the analogue for u of the curve S, and then show
that since T must be piecewise-linear, quantifiable revenue is lost due to the complementary
slackness conditions not holding in the region between S and T . It is not immediately clear
how to define T , though.
Intuitively we would have liked to define T to be the curve on [0, x′] above which u awards
Good 2 with probability 1 and below which u awards Good 2 with probability 0, but what
if u also awards Good 2 with fractional probability? How should we define T in such cases?
(Remember that all that we know about u is that it has small menu-size.) As we will see
below, to show that we indeed have quantifiably sufficient revenue loss from any deviation
of T from S, we will define T as the curve above which u awards Good 2 with probability
more than one half, and below which u awards Good 2 with probability less than or equal to
one half. As will become clear from our calculations, the constant one half could have been
replaced here with any fixed fraction,17 but crucially it could not have been replaced with
0 (i.e., defining T as the curve above which u awards Good 2 with positive probability and
below which u does not award Good 2) or with 1 (i.e., defining T as the curve above which u
awards Good 2 with probability 1 and below which u awards Good 2 with probability strictly
less than 1).
We are now finally ready to prove Theorem 2, with the help of the following proposition,
which may be of separate interest. (We prove Proposition 5 following the proof of Theorem 2.)
Proposition 5. Let S : [0, x′]→ R be a concave function with radius of curvature at most r
everywhere, for some r < ∞. For small enough δ, the following holds. For any piecewise-
linear function T : [0, x′]→ R composed of at most x′
8
√
rδ
linear segments, the Lebesgue measure
of the set of coordinates x1 with |S(x1)− T (x1)| > δ is at least x′/2.
Proof of Theorem 2. The curve S (see Figure 1) that separates the regions Z and A is given
by x2 =
2−3x1
4−5x1 (where x1 ∈ [0, x′]) (Daskalakis et al., 2015). Therefore, it is strictly concave,
having radius of curvature at most r everywhere, for some fixed r < ∞. We note also that
there exists a constant d > 0 and a neighborhood N of the curve S in R in which the density
of µˆ′ is (negative and) smaller than −d.
Let ε > 0 and set δ ,
√
8ε
x′·d . Assume without loss of generality that ε is sufficiently small
so that both i) the δ-neighborhood of S in R is contained in the neighborhood N of S, and
ii) Proposition 5 holds with respect to δ. Let C , x′
8
√
rδ
= Ω(1/ 4√ε).
Let u be the utility function of a mechanism M with menu-size at most C, and let
T : [0, x′]→ [0, 1] be defined as follows:
T (x1) , inf
{
x2 ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣ u′2(x1, x2) > 1/2} = sup{x2 ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣ u′2(x1, x2) ≤ 1/2}.
17Similarly, the direction of tie breaking with respect to the region where Good 2 is awarded with probability
precisely one half could have been flipped.
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It is well known that the graph of u is the maximum of C planes. Therefore, T is a piecewise-
linear function composed of at most C linear segments.
Let y1 ∈ [0, x′] with T (y1) − S(y1) > δ. Let y2 ∈
(
S(y1), S(y1)+δ/2
)
and let x2 be such
that γˆ transfers positive mass from x , (y1, x2) to y , (y1, y2). (All mass transferred to y
by γˆ is from points of this form.) We note that by definition of T ,
u(x)− u(y) ≤ x2 − y2 − δ/4 =
∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1 − δ/4.
Similarly, let y1 ∈ [0, x′] with S(y1)−T (y1) > δ. Let y2 ∈
(
S(y1)−δ/2, S(y1)
)
. Note that γˆ
transfers positive mass from x , (0, 0) to y , (y1, y2). (All mass transferred to y by γˆ is from
the point x.) We note that by definition of T ,
u(x)− u(y) ≤ −δ/4 = ∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1 − δ/4.
By Proposition 5, the Lebesgue measure of the set of coordinates y1 with
∣∣S(y1)−T (y1)∣∣ >
δ is at least x′/2. Similarly to Equation (6), we therefore obtain
RevF 2(M) =
=
∫
[0,1]2
udµ ≤
∫
[0,1]2
udµˆ′ =
∫
[0,1]2
ud(µˆ′+ − µˆ′−) =
∫
[0,1]2×[0,1]2
(
u(x)− u(y))dγˆ(x, y) ≤
≤
∫
[0,1]2×[0,1]2
∣∣(x− y)+∣∣1dγˆ(x, y)− δ/4 · δ/2 · x′/2 · d = ∫
[0,1]2
uˆdµ− δ/4 · δ/2 · x′/2 · d =
= OPT(F 2)− δ/4 · δ/2 · x′/2 · d = OPT(F 2)− ε/2 < OPT(F 2)− ε, (7)
as required (this is precisely Equation (3) in full detail).
Proof of Proposition 5. We will show that from each linear segment of T , at most a Lebesgue
measure 4
√
rδ of coordinates x1 satisfy∣∣S(x1)− T (x1)∣∣ ≤ δ. (8)
This implies the proposition since this means that from all linear segments of T together, at
most a Lebesgue measure x
′
8
√
rδ
· 4√rδ = x′
2
of coordinates x1 satisfy Equation (8), and hence
at least a Lebesgue measure x
′
2
of coordinates x1 satisfy
∣∣S(x1)− T (x1)∣∣ > δ, as required.
For a Lebesgue measure m of coordinates from a single linear segment of T to satisfy
Equation (8), we note that a necessary condition is that m be at most the length of a chord
of sagitta at most 2δ in a circle of radius at most r. (See Figure 2.) We claim that this
implies that m ≤ √16rδ − 16δ2 ≤ 4√rδ, as required. Indeed, in the extreme case where m
is the length of a chord of sagitta precisely 2δ in a circle of radius precisely r, we have by a
standard use of the Intersecting Chords Theorem18 that (m
2
)2 = (2r− 2δ) · 2δ. Solving for m,
we have that (in the extreme case) m =
√
16rδ − 16δ2, as claimed.
18The Intersecting Chords Theorem states that when two chords of the same circle intersect, the product
of the lengths of the two segments (that are delineated by the intersection point) of one chord equals the
product of the lengths of the two segments of the other.
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ST
2δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
Figure 2: In the extreme case where S is an arc of radius r, a line segment with the maximum
Lebesgue measure of coordinates satisfying Equation (8) is a horizontal chord of sagitta 2δ
in a circle (the circle of the top dotted arc) of radius r.
3 Upper Bound
Recall that Theorem 1, due to Hart and Nisan (2013), provides an upper bound of O(1/ε4) on
the menu-size of some mechanism that maximizes revenue up to an additive ε. Their proof
uses virtually no information regarding the structure of the optimal mechanism: it starts
with a revenue-maximizing mechanism, and cleverly rounds two of the three coordinates
(allocation probability of Good 1, allocation probability of Good 2, price) of every outcome,
to obtain a mechanism with small menu-size without significant revenue loss. We will follow
a similar strategy, but will only round one of these three coordinates (namely, the price),
using a result by Pavlov (2011) that shows that under an assumption on distributions that
is standard in the economics literature on multidimensional mechanism design (see, e.g.,
McAfee and McMillan, 1988; Manelli and Vincent, 2006; Pavlov, 2011), for an appropriate
choice of revenue-maximizing mechanism, one of the other (allocation) coordinates is in fact
already rounded (specifically, it is either zero or one).
Definition 1 (McAfee and McMillan, 1988). A distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]n) is said to satisfy
the McAfee-McMillan hazard condition if it has a differentiable density function f satisfying
(n+ 1)f(x) + x · ∇f(x) ≥ 0
for every x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Theorem 6 (Pavlov, 2011). For every distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]2) satisfying the McAfee-
McMillan hazard condition (for n = 2), there exists a mechanism M that maximizes the
revenue from F and has no outcome for which both allocation probabilities are in the open
interval (0, 1).
Our upper bound follows by combining the argument of Hart and Nisan (2013) with
Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let M be a revenue-maximizing mechanism for F as in Theorem 6.
Let δ , ε2, and for every real number t, denote by btcδ the rounding-down of t to the
nearest integer multiple of δ. Let M ′ be the mechanism whose menu is comprised of all
outcomes of the form (p1, p2; (1−ε)·btcδ) for every outcome (p1, p2; t) of M (where pi is the
allocation probability of Good i, and t is the price charged in this outcome). We claim that
RevF (M
′) > (1− ε) · RevF (M)− ε ≥ RevF (M)− 2ε.
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The main idea of the “nudge and round” argument of Hart and Nisan (2013) is that
while the rounding (which is performed to reduce the menu-size — see below), by itself
(without the discounting, which is the “nudge” part), could have hypothetically constituted
the “last straw” that causes some buyer type to switch from preferring a very expensive
outcome to preferring a very cheap one (thus significantly hurting the revenue), since more
expensive outcomes are more heavily discounted, then this compensates for any such “last
straw” effects. More concretely, while the rounding, before the ε-discounting, can cause a
buyer’s utility from any outcome to shift by at most ε2 (which could be the “last straw”),
and since for any outcome whose price is cheaper by more than an ε compared to the buyer’s
original outcome of choice the given discount is smaller by at least ε2, this smaller discount
more than eliminates any potential utility gain due to rounding, so such an outcome would
not become the most-preferred one. We will now formally show this.
Fix a type x = (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2 for the buyer. Let e be the outcome according to M
when the buyer has type x. It is enough to show that the buyer pays at least (1−ε)te − ε
according to M ′ when she has type x. (We denote the price of, e.g., e by te.) Let f ′ be a
possible outcome of M ′, and let f be the outcome of M that corresponds to it. We will show
that if (1−ε)btfcδ < (1−ε)(btecδ − ε), then a buyer of type x strictly prefers the outcome e′
of M ′ that corresponds to e over f ′ (and so does not choose f ′ in M ′). Indeed, since in this
case btfcδ < btecδ − ε, we have that
ux(e
′) ≥ ux(e) + ε · btecδ ≥ ux(f) + ε · btecδ > ux(f ′)− δ − ε · btfcδ + ε · btecδ =
= ux(f
′)− δ + ε · (btecδ − btfcδ) > ux(f ′)− δ + ε · ε = ux(f ′),
so in M ′, a buyer of type x pays at least
(1−ε)(btecδ − ε) > (1−ε)(te − δ − ε) = (1− ε)(te − ε2 − ε) > (1− ε)te − ε.
How many menu entries does M ′ really have (i.e., how many menu entries ever get chosen by
the buyer)? The number of menu entries (p1, p2; t) with p1 = 1 is at most O(1/ε2), since for
every price t (there are O(1/ε2) such options) we can assume without loss of generality that
only the menu entry (p1, p2; t) with highest p2 will ever be chosen.
19 A similar argument for
the cases p1 = 0, p2 = 0, and p2 = 1 (by Theorem 6, no more cases exist beyond these four)
shows that in total there really are at most O(1/ε2) menu entries in M ′, as required.
We note that both Pavlov (2011) and Kash and Frongillo (2016) conjecture that the con-
clusion of Theorem 6 holds under more general conditions than the McAfee-McMillan hazard
condition. An affirmation of (either of) these conjectures would, by the above proof, immedi-
ately imply that the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds under the same generalized assumptions.
Hart and Nisan (2013) also analyze the scenario of a two-good distribution supported
on [1, H]2 for any given H, and give an upper bound of O(log2H/ε5) on the menu-size that
suffices for revenue maximization up to a multiplicative ε. Using the above techniques, their
argument could be similarly modified to give an improved upper bound of O(logH/ε2) in that
setting for distributions F ∈ ∆([1, H]2) satisfying the McAfee-McMillan hazard condition
(or any generalized condition under which the conclusion of Theorem 6 holds).
19If a maximum such p2 is not attained, then we can add a suitable menu entry with the supremum of
such p2; see Babaioff et al. (2017) for a full argument.
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4 Extensions
4.1 More than Two Goods
Recall that Corollary 3 concludes, from our menu-size lower bound (Theorem 2) and the
menu-size upper bound of Hart and Nisan (2013) (Theorem 1), a tight bound on the mini-
mum deterministic communication complexity guaranteed to suffice for running some up-to-ε
revenue-maximizing mechanism for selling two goods, thereby completely resolving this prob-
lem. In fact, since Hart and Nisan (2013) prove an upper bound of (n/ε)O(n) (later strengthened
to (logn/ε)O(n) by Dughmi et al., 2014) on the menu-size required for revenue maximization
up to an additive ε when selling any number of goods n, we obtain our tight communication-
complexity bound not only for two goods, but for any fixed number of goods n ≥ 2:
Corollary 7 (Communication Complexity: Tight Bound for Any Number of Goods). Fix
n ≥ 2. There exists Dn(ε) = Θ(log 1/ε) such that for every ε > 0 it is the case that Dn(ε)
is the minimum communication complexity that satisfies the following: for every distribution
F ∈ ∆([0, 1]n) there exists a mechanism M for selling n goods such that the deterministic
communication complexity of running M is Dn(ε) and such that RevF (M) > OPT(F ) − ε.
This continues to hold even if F is guaranteed to be a product distribution.
For the case of one good, the seminal result of Myerson (1981) shows that there exists
a (precisely) revenue-maximizing mechanism with only two possible outcomes (and hence
deterministic communication complexity of 1), which simply offers the good for a suitably
chosen take-it-or-leave-it price. Corollary 7 therefore shows a precise dichotomy in the asymp-
totic communication complexity of up-to-ε revenue maximization, between the case of one
good (Myerson’s result; 1 bit of communication) on the one hand, and the case of any other
fixed number of goods (Θ(log 1/ε) bits of communication) on the other hand.
4.2 Multiplicative Approximation
In a scenario where the valuations may be unbounded, i.e., vi ∈ [0,∞) for all i, Hart and
Nisan (2013) have shown that no finite menu-size suffices for maximizing revenue up to a
multiplicative20 ε, and consequently Hart and Nisan (2014) asked21 whether this impossibility
may be overcome for the case of independently distributed valuations for the goods. Babaioff,
Gonczarowski, and Nisan (2017) gave a positive answer, showing that for every n and ε, a
finite menu-size suffices, and moreover gave an upper bound of (logn/ε)O(n) on the sufficient
menu-size. Since for valuations in [0, 1], revenue maximization up to a multiplicative ε is a
stricter requirement than revenue maximization up to an additive ε, our lower bound from
Theorem 2 immediately provides a lower bound for this scenario as well.
Corollary 8 (Menu-Size for Multiplicative Approximation: Lower Bound). There exist
C(ε) = Ω(1/ 4√ε) and a distribution F ∈ ∆([0, 1]) ⊆ ∆([0,∞)), such that for every ε > 0
it is the case that RevF 2(M) < (1− ε) ·OPT(F 2) for every mechanism M with menu-size at
most C(ε).
20For unbounded valuations, it makes no sense to consider additive guarantees, as the problem is invariant
under scaling of the currency.
21Hart and Nisan (2014) is a manuscript combining Hart and Nisan (2013) with an earlier paper.
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By an argument similar to that yielding Corollary 7, using the above upper bound of
Babaioff et al. (2017) in lieu of that of Hart and Nisan (2013) / Dughmi et al. (2014), we
therefore obtain an analogue of Corollary 7 for this setting as well.
Corollary 9 (Communication Complexity of Multiplicative Approximation: Tight Bound).
Fix n ≥ 2. There exists Dn(ε) = Θ(log 1/ε) such that for every ε > 0 it is the case
that Dn(ε) is the minimum communication complexity that satisfies the following: for ev-
ery product distribution F ∈ ∆([0,∞))n there exists a mechanism M for selling n goods
such that the deterministic communication complexity of running M is Dn(ε) and such that
RevF (M) > (1− ε) ·OPT(F ). This continues to hold even if each of the distributions whose
product is F is guaranteed to be supported in [0, 1].
Corollary 9 shows that the dichotomy between one good and any other fixed number of
goods that is shown by Corollary 7 also holds for multiplicative up-to-ε revenue maximization.
5 Discussion
In a very recent paper, Saxena et al. (2018) analyze the menu-size required for approximate
revenue maximization in what is known as the FedEx problem (Fiat et al., 2016). Inter-
estingly, they also use piecewise-linear approximation of concave functions to derive their
bounds. Nonetheless, there are considerably many differences between their analysis and
ours, e.g.: the effects of bad piecewise-linear approximation on the revenue,22 the approxi-
mated/approximating object,23 the mathematical features of the approximated object,24 the
geometric/analytic proof of the bound on the number of linear segments, and finally, the
argument that uses the piecewise-linear approximation and whether or not it couples the
desired approximation with another parameter of the problem.25 It therefore seems to be
unlikely that both analyses are special cases of some general analysis, and so it would be in-
teresting to see whether piecewise-linear approximations of concave (or other) functions “pop
up” in the future in any additional contexts in connection with bounds on the menu-size of
mechanisms.26
As mentioned in Section 4, Babaioff et al. (2017) prove an upper bound on the menu-size
required for multiplicative up-to-ε approximate revenue maximization when selling n goods
to an additive buyer with independently distributed valuations. For any fixed n, this bound
is polynomial in 1/ε, and the lower bound that we establish in Corollary 8 shows in particular
that a polynomial dependence cannot be avoided here (e.g., it cannot be reduced to a loga-
rithmic or lower dependence) even for bounded distributions, yielding a tight communication-
complexity bound (see Corollary 9 in Section 4). Alternatively to fixing n and analyzing the
22There: even a single point having large distance can cause quantifiable revenue loss; Here: at least a
certain measure of points having large distance causes quantifiable revenue loss.
23There: revenue curves, with vertices corresponding to menu entries; Here: contour lines of the allocation
function, with edges corresponding to menu entries.
24There: piecewise-linear; Here: strictly concave.
25There: lower bound achieved by coupling the desired approximation with the number of possible dead-
lines n (setting ε , 1/n2); Here: desired approximation uncoupled from the number of goods n.
26Incidentally, other known derivations of menu-size bounds, such as those in Hart and Nisan (2013),
Dughmi et al. (2014), and Babaioff et al. (2017), do not use (even implicitly, to the best of our understanding)
piecewise-linear approximations.
14
menu-size and communication complexity as functions of ε as we do, one may fix ε and ana-
lyze these quantities as functions of n. For any fixed ε > 0, the upper bound of Babaioff et al.
(2017) is exponential in n; therefore, another question left open by that paper is whether this
exponential dependence may be avoided. (In terms of communication complexity, this ques-
tion asks whether for every fixed ε, the communication complexity can be logarithmic or even
polylogarithmic in n.) Some progress on this question has been made already by Babaioff
et al. (2017), who show that on the one hand, a polynomial dependence on n suffices for some
values of ε (namely, ε ≥ 5/6), and that on the other hand, an exponential dependence on n is
required when coupling ε with the number of goods n by setting ε , 1/n;27 however, as noted
above, they leave the general case of arbitrary fixed ε > 0 (uncoupled from n, e.g., ε = 1%) as
their main remaining open question. While the current state-of-the-art literature seems to be
a long way from identifying very-high-dimensional optimal mechanisms, and especially from
identifying their duals (indeed, it took quite some impressive effort for Giannakopoulos and
Koutsoupias (2014) to identify the optimal mechanism for 6 goods whose valuations are i.i.d.
uniform in [0, 1]), one may hope that with time, it may be possible to do so. It seems plausible
that if one could generate high-dimensional optimal mechanisms (and corresponding duals)
for which the high-dimensional analogue of the curve that we denote by S in Section 2 has
large-enough measure (while maintaining a small-enough radius of curvature, etc.), then an
argument similar to the one that we give in the proof of Theorem 2 may be used to show that
an exponential dependence on n in the above bound is indeed required for sufficiently small,
yet fixed, ε, and thereby resolve the above open question. Whether one can generate such
mechanisms with large-enough high-dimensional analogues of S, however, remains to be seen.
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